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Sustainability management at the WestLB 1
At the end of his presentation, Marek Wallenfels, Associate Director of WestLB’s Sus-
tainability Management unit, could not hide his pride: “Did you know that our unit was
awarded the Sustainable Bankers of the Year Award 2006?” he said in a small execu-
tive education seminar of the Hertie School of Governance with a smile on his face.
The WestLB has come a long way from being at the centre of criticism for ill-advised
investment decisions, political engineering, potential bribery and nepotism to present-
ing a showcase for sustainability management and CSR in just over 4 years. In 2000
the bank was infamous for refusing to respond to any criticism by NGOs for financing a
highly controversial pipeline project in Ecuador. Today the bank not only has installed a
sophisticated procedure of assessing the environmental and social implications of in-
frastructure projects but aims at further developing international industry standards for
project financing as already started with the Equator Principles. It regularly holds
stakeholder dialogues with major NGOs to discuss problems with projects it finances.
The main reason Marek Wallenfels gives for the bank’s change of strategy is the man-
agement of risks. “Non-financial risks easily translate into financial risks and business
risks” he points out while showing photos of marching protesters at rallies in Ecuador
and Düsseldorf. Even a firm which does business to business and cannot be targeted
by customer boycotts can be harmed by having a bad reputation in the sustainability
world.
In his view, business responsibility goes far beyond the law. The bank assesses the
track record of compliance with environmental and social standards of the firms apply-
ing for finance before it goes ahead. The sustainability unit systematically checks the
reputation of its customers employing a “Conflict Radar”. A bad reputation increases
the risk. High risks might lead to a negative assessment of the project or to renegotia-
tions of the loan. By developing an industry standard WestLB and other commercial
banks themselves fill the regulatory gap that exists at the international level.
A rosy picture of the world of infrastructure financing?
The story of the WestLB
The WestLB was one of the most prominent public banks in Germany, led for many
years by Friedel Neuber. Neuber, who came from a working-class background, started
his career as a regional politician for the Social-Democrats and moved into public bank-
ing only later on. His career sums up what is called the “Deutschland AG” (“Germany
Inc.”): a system of highly intertwined vested interests of public policy, local politicians
and their public banks. Friedel Neuber headed the bank between 1981 and 2001. In
2001 Neuber was removed from his position as head of the public bank. He was ac-
cused of corruption and fraud but not convicted. He died in 2004.
1 This case is based on a study commissioned by the Bertelsmann Foundation, which is published in Ger-
man “Verantwortung für die Gesellschaft - verantwortlich für das Geschäft. Ein Managementhandbuch",
forthcoming. The financial assistance by the Bertelsmann Foundation for turning the research into a tea-
ching case is kindly appreciated.
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In 2002, WestLB was the biggest public bank in Germany ranking fifth among German
banks. It was the central player in regional politics of North Rhine-Westphalia. Helmut
Linssen, a member of the regional parliament for the conservative party and today’s
North Rhine-Westphalia’s Minister of Finance said in 2000: “The real economic policy
of the Land is made by WestLB”.
It was also in 2002 that the first financial loss of 1.7 billion Euros incurred. The bank
was then subjected to an inquiry by Bafin, the German federal financial supervisory
authority in 2003, in the course of which the interim CEO Jürgen Sengera (2001 –
2003) had to resign. In that same year the general public became aware of the financial
problems which plagued WestLB, most of which were due to a deal with the UK-based
firm Boxclever, a company involved with TV leasing. The bad loan WestLB issued was
the main but not the only reason for a period of losses beginning in 2002. This crisis
was also one of the starting points for the subsequent paradigm shift of the bank, its
complete reconstruction, namely the split in a commercial and a public bank and may
also be the turning-point for the whole system of public banking in Germany.
In the course of the public debate, politicians – even the land’s Prime Minister Peer
Steinbrück - were accused of not taking their mandate in the bank seriously. The Ger-
man financial supervision authority, Bafin, checked out on the whole Boxclever
involvement and the broader allegations put forward by the press, some politicians and
other critics that the banks governance was largely insufficient. In their final report on
the bank’s situation Bafin’s experts supported the allegation. In the case of Boxclever,
the executive board of WestLB had not informed the supervisory board effectively and
its corporate governance and management were criticised.
Mid 2003, even the German public prosecution authority took action, suspecting man-
agement defalcation. Robin Saunders, head of the principle finance group in the UK
and the main responsible person on the operative level, was next to leave the bank.
The bank then sued the eight members of management involved in the Box-clever ad-
venture. The lawsuit was later settled with some insurance companies paying a small
part of the damage because they had insured the management against management
liabilities.
The next interim CEO in the second half of 2003 was J. Ringel before Thomas Fischer
of Deutsche Bank took over as the CEO of WestLB on the first of January 2004, then a
commercial bank. He still leads the bank today.
Political links, potential bribery, nepotism, and the like were not the only accusations
put forward against the public bank. One was its controversial role in financing infra-
structure projects abroad, especially the OCP pipeline in Ecuador. The OCP project,
which apparently had a deep impact on social and environmental welfare of Ecuador’s
population, was vividly discussed in the German press. But when an NGO campaign
against WestLB started in 2000, WestLB refused any dialogue with NGOs. WestLB's
unwillingness to speak with its critics became synonymous for the arrogant and incom-
petent behaviour some companies thought adequate with which to face competition in
global capitalism, without making any effort at humane concessions.
In the midst of the bank’s crisis, in 2002/2003, WestLB started developing the Equator
principles together with Barclay’s, ABN Amro, and Citibank. The four banks drafted the
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standard in cooperation with the International Finance Corporation, IFC, a World Bank
affiliate. The Equator principles were planned to become an industry standard for the
financing of infrastructure projects. They still are guidelines for the financial sector that
define social and ecological standards for the financing of international infrastructure
projects. When seeking funding for infrastructure projects, the debtor must prove the
legal compliance of his venture as well as the compliance with these principles in addi-
tion to the usual procedures of risks assessment. Today, 41 financial institutions have
adopted the Equator principles.
A WestLB press officer said in June 2003 that WestLB’s engagement for the Equator
principles had nothing to do with the OCP project, but with a general commitment of
WestLB to international project standards.
Especially the German NGO “urgewald” became a famous critic of WestLB’s invest-
ments abroad. WestLB and urgewald first met in 2002 in a parliamentary session on
the pipeline in North Rhine-Westphalia’s parliament.
In 2004, the bank reinvented itself. Under the lead of the new CEO, “the new WestLB”
took first steps to open a dialogue with its critics. The division “sustainability manage-
ment” was created employing five experts. “WestLB seeks to become a national leader
in sustainability matters” said Marek Wallenfels one of the new heads In 2005, the bank
issued its first sustainability report and carried out its first stakeholder survey.
At the same time, the public banking sector had been pressurised by private banks as
well as by the European Commission because of “illegitimate subsidies”. After the deep
losses the bank incurred in 2002 and 2003, WestLB accepted to pay back 1.4 billion
Euros to the State of North Rhine-Westphalia in 2004. The money was considered an
illegitimate subsidy by the EU Commission and the private banks. In 2005, institutional
liability and guarantor liability, the legal instruments which protected public banks
against credit failures in Germany, were removed. This meant higher costs in terms of
interest rates and a higher degree of dependence on rating agencies. The new frame-
work “Basel II” which will be effective from 2007 in Europe points in the same direction.
Banks – including public banks – now have to assess credit risks individually and put
risk-adequate amounts of money aside to secure them.
Stakeholders such as employees, government representatives, NGO’s, clients or sav-
ings bank employees still put the bank under continuous stress today but appreciate
the bank’s efforts in achieving transparency and more openness to the public. Although
they are not yet convinced of the merits of the new banking policies, they expect major
steps for the future. WestLB and urgewald hold talks about five or six times per year. In
the eyes of WestLB, at least some of the urgewald activists have become more prag-
matic.
Background
WestLB AG
The publicly listed WestLB AG is a European commercial bank having its roots in North
Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s largest federal state. With total assets of € 265 billion as 
of December 31, 2005, it is one of Germany’s leading financial service providers. It is
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the central institution for the savings banks in North Rhine-Westphalia and Branden-
burg, and as an internationally operating commercial bank it acts as their link to the
global financial markets. Working in close partnership with the savings banks, WestLB
offers the full range of products and services of a universal bank, focusing on lending,
structured finance, capital market and private equity products, asset management,
transaction services and real estate finance. WestLB made a net profit of 414 million
Euros in 2005 (as compared to a loss of more than 1 billion Euros in 2004) and em-
ploys 6,353 staff (full-time equivalent as of December 30, 2005).
WestLB was created in 1969 by the merger of its established predecessor institutions,
Landesbank für Westfalen Girozentrale, Münster, founded in 1832, and Rheinische
Girozentrale und Provinzialbank, Düsseldorf, founded in 1854. In 2002, WestLB was
split in two. WestLB AG, the commercial bank, is now a joint stock company. The main
shareholders are the savings banks and the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. There is
no free float. The entire commercial business activities of the former WestLB are now
concentrated in WestLB AG. The Landesbank NRW (now NRW.BANK) took over the
public mission activities and remains a public bank.
The German Financial System
Although other European countries have privatised their savings banks (Italy and
Spain) and transformed their financial systems (France), in Germany, the public bank-
ing sector still flourishes. The German system is quite unique. It has been a three-pillar
system for more than one century, the first being the so-called public sector – savings
banks (retail) and their heads, the Land banks (refinancing and clearing, Landesbank)
and their central bank, the DGZ-Deka Bank. In the savings bank sector, according to
the regional principle which limits their activities to specific geographic zones, there is
no competition among the individual savings banks. The other two pillars are the coop-
erative and the commercial banks.
The savings banks and the “Landesbanken” (state banks of the federal states) own
35% of the domestic assets (2005), an additional part of 12 % is owned by the coop-
erative sector. Still, neither the savings banks nor the cooperative banks are strictly
profit-oriented.
The finance sector in Germany suffers from small margins. Most analysts claim that the
German banking system performs poorly. Although the commercial banks have espe-
cially suffered from the decline of interest margins, their margins are still slightly higher
than those of the savings banks. This is an indicator that in case that a funding advan-
tage (through institutional liability and guarantor liability) existed, savings banks either
passed their advantages on to consumers, or “wasted” it elsewhere. For example,
German saving banks are the important sponsors of the arts in Germany and have the
largest foundations.
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Many experts claim that the German financial system is in a transition phase from a
bank-based system to a capital market-based system in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, but
some question this claim as the German financial system has proven surprisingly sta-
ble despite the considerable movement in the different sectors. Germany is generally
seen as “overbanked” (bank branches per capita) in international comparison. As a
possible consequence, both groups savings banks and cooperative banks, experi-
enced a major process of concentration (a declining number of banks and branches) in
the last decade.
Regulation and supervision is much the same in Germany as in other countries. The
financial regulation authority, Bafin assures smooth functioning, monitors and licenses
banks and carries out individual regulatory measures while Germany’s shrinking central
bank, the “Bundesbank” is responsible for the general banking supervision and interna-
tional affairs.
German public banking had for a long time mainly been characterised by “institutional
liability” and “guarantor liability”, two instruments of state guarantees which reduce the
banks’ risk because their liabilities are secured by the state. As state entities, these
guarantees make it easy for them to refinance themselves cheaply. In turn, the gov-
ernment profits from cheap refinancing, because their lending is cheaper than
commercial loans. Of course, refinancing is also cheaper for commercial loans, mort-
gages or consumer credits, because the guarantees encompass the whole business of
public banks which means that a higher spread can be attained in case the advantage
is not passed on to the banks’ clients.
In 1999, the European banking federation addressed the European Commission and
claimed that two German instruments harmed competition in banking because they
lead to better ratings and lower interest rates for public banks and had thus to be con-
sidered as subsidies. The European Commission followed their argumentation and had
the German government abolish both.
Another new means of regulation in the international financial sector is Basle II. Started
by the G 10 countries, the Basel II regulations were accepted for the EU and are
scheduled to take effect in 2007 (the US joining the set of rules later). International
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banks will be required to align their capital backing of credit risks with the actual and
specific risks incurred (in contrast to current capital backing rules, which rather general-
ise these risks). The required amount of capital backing will largely depend on a
borrower’s internal and/or external rating. Operational risks will have to be backed with
equity capital as well. The new regulations have begun to cast a shadow on European
economies. Especially small and medium-sized enterprises throughout Europe com-
plain about the “credit squeeze”, meaning increasing difficulties in finding banks still
willing to offer affordable loans.
The latest example for the challenges public banking is facing is the EU commission’s
attempt to take away another privilege: German savings banks will not be allowed to
call themselves “Savings Banks” and make exclusive use of their trade mark. This at-
tempt might prove to have far-reaching consequences, because it might facilitate
privatisation of public banking.
International Project financing
Banks issue loans for big infrastructural projects on a global scale. The borrower
(debtor) is the project itself and the interest is paid out of the cash flow the project real-
ises. There are about 200 such projects in the world every year.
Urgewald
Urgewald is a small German NGO for the protection of human rights and environmental
protection with eight employees. It is financed by grants and donations. It is specialised
in campaigning against banks financing big infrastructure projects which are socially or
environmentally detrimental. Another main focus is the global paper industry and its
role in devastating the rain forests. Urgewald only takes action where German players
are involved and thus came into the game when the WestLB case was discussed in an
expert hearing of the North Rhine Westphalian parliament in 2002. WestLB became
one of their main adversaries. Urgewald holds that in terms of sustainability the Equa-
tor principles constitute a step aback rather than a step ahead for German banks. “Until
now German banks have relied on the World Bank’s standards which are tougher”,
said director Heffa Schücking. Urgewald stated that WestLB declined to discuss its
policy with NGOs at least 20 times.
The reaction of politics
From 1995 to 2005, North Rhine-Westphalia was governed by a coalition of the green
party Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and the Social Democratic Party SPD. The minister for
environmental affairs at the time was Bärbel Höhn, member of the Green Party.
In January 2002, there was a parliamentary expert hearing on the OCP pipeline in the
course of which many experts voiced extensive criticism. The committee decided to
send two members of parliament – one green, one social democrat - to Ecuador for a
closer examination of the pipeline project. In the resulting report, Ute Koczy and Bern-
hard von Gründberg stated that the project was not carried out according to the World
Bank standards and that the project should be stopped (moratorium) so that an as-
sessment and amendments to the procedures could be made.
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At the same time, the Green Party put pressure on the politicians who were representa-
tives of the supervisory board of in the firm to minimise risks in the project. In 2003, the
Green Party in the North Rhine Westphalian parliament issued a motion of the parlia-
mentary group (Fraktionsbeschluss) on banking and sustainability. The motion
criticised WestLB for its business strategy, for the OCP project and for its in-
transparent communication. The paper also voiced clear claims concerning a new and
more responsible policy of WestLB. It requested the regional government to make the
bank implement social and environmental standards. It asked local savings banks to
develop sustainable strategies.
It was the government of North Rhine-Westphalia, mainly at the instigation of the
Green Party that removed Sengera, the interim CEO and Seibert, the “Arbeitsdirektor”,
another member of the board at WestLB in 2003 and in the end appointed Fischer as
the new CEO.
The state had been governed by social democrats (and their partners in coalitions) for
39 years. The elections in 2005 put the conservative party into power, which was the
beginning of the end of the red-green government at the federal level in Berlin. Just as
the beginning of the red-green coalition in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1995 marked the
beginning of the red-green era in federal politics, its end entailed the end of the red-
green coalition at the federal level.
The OCP pipeline project
The OCP pipeline project was a major investment in Ecuador. The project company
OCP (Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados) was registered on the Cayman Islands; it was a
consortium of oil companies. The new pipeline was meant to replace an old state-
owned pipeline, which had been built for Chevron Texaco, in the medium run. The
main criticisms voiced were that the new pipeline was superfluous, that the country’s
resources were sold out, that the pipeline touched several ecologically sensitive areas
in the rainforest, that the rights of indigenous people were neglected, and that emer-
gency plans in the earthquake area were insufficient, while social and ecological risks
were huge. Urgewald claims that the bank used biased expert reports to state ecologi-
cal compliance.
WestLB assured its critics that the project adhered to World Bank standards. However,
the World Bank refused to acknowledge this in a letter to WestLB in 2001. In 2002,
Robert Goodland, expert on the World Bank Standards, wrote in his expert report that
the OCP projects violated the standards in four major points, namely: the choice of the
least impact route was carried out without public consultation, there was involuntary
resettlement without the necessary resettlement plans and compensation, the natural
habitat was harmed without finding effective means to minimise the losses of land and
habitat and indigenous people were affected in a manner which did not comply with the
standards.
Critical NGOs such as “Amazon Watch” said “Wide-ranging opposition has taken a
heavy toll on the OCP project. In August 2002, controversy forced former OCP Presi-
dent Hernan Lara to resign, while industry estimates show that delays from
environmental and social controversies have already put the OCP nearly $ 200 million
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over budget. In October 2002, one of the two financial rating agencies for the project,
Moody’s, downgraded the OCP’s investment rating to borderline junk status (Baa3)
citing, inter alia, growing environmental, political and economic risks.“
In 2003, it was taken out of the rating altogether. Moody’s also lowered the financial
strength rating of WestLB in two steps to E in 2003, during WestLB’s most intense cri-
sis, which was characterised by public uproar, financial losses, prosecution and
reconstruction of the entire institution. Today, the overall rating of the commercial bank
is back to A1 status.
The OCP pipeline has in the meantime been completed, but critics may still be heard.
In 2005 critics, such as the Rainforest Information Centre Australia, said explosives
were not removed and threatened indigenous people. Furthermore, natural resources
are now exploited even faster, pollution is ubiquitous, new roads are built and harm the
rainforest further. At the same time, 70 to 80 % of the incoming money must be spent
on interest. NGOs claim that the business is not a complete success – the pipeline
transports less oil than planned and is not as profitable as projected. This is disputed
by the bank.
Ecuador
Ecuador is a democracy but is one of the world’s most corrupt countries according to
the the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index: 113 out of 133. It has
a population of about 12.5 million. GDP: $ 12 billion, per capita GDP is about $ 1.000
(rank 71 in the world), growth 3.5 %, inflation 8 %. Distribution of income: wealthiest
10% / poorest 10 %: 49.7/2.2 (1995). Share of population earning less than $ 2 per
day: 52.3%
The World Bank, the IFC, and the Equator principles
The International Finance Corporation, IFC, is the private sector branch of the World
Bank Group. Its mission is to promote sustainable private sector investment in develop-
ing countries, helping to reduce poverty and improve people's lives. To achieve this,
IFC provides loans, equity, structured finance and risk management products, and ad-
visory services to build up the private sector in developing countries. IFC invests in
enterprises majority-owned by the private sector throughout most developing countries
in the world. In fiscal 2005, IFC invested in 236 projects in 67 countries covering all
developing regions. The IFC emphasizes five strategic priorities for maximising its sus-
tainable development impact:
• Strengthening its focus on frontier markets, particularly the SME sector;
• Building long-term partnerships with emerging global players in developing
countries;
• Differentiating IFC from its competitors through sustainability;
• Addressing constraints to private sector investment in infrastructure, health, and
education; and
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• Developing domestic financial markets through institution building and the use
of innovative financial products.
For all new investments, IFC articulates the expected impact on sustainable develop-
ment, and, as the projects mature, assesses the quality of the development benefits
realised.
IFC offers an array of financial products and services to its clients and continues to
develop new financial tools that enable companies to manage risk and broaden their
access to foreign and domestic capital markets. It also offers a range of technical as-
sistance and advisory services in support of private sector development in developing
countries.
IFC coordinates its activities with the other institutions of the World Bank Group but is
legally and financially independent. IFC's 178 member countries provide its authorised
share capital of $ 2.4 billion, collectively determine its policies, and approve invest-
ments. IFC’s current President is Paul Wolfowitz. It has 2,400 staff and its
headquarters are in Washington CD.
The World Bank is not a normal bank but consists of two development institutions, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD, and the International
Development Association, IDA. Its aim is poverty reduction and an improvement of
living standards around the world. The World Bank was established in 1944 in Bretton
Woods together with the International Monetary Fund, IMF, as one pillar of the world’s
financial architecture after World War II. The World Bank has 10,000 employees, has
offices around the world and entertains several “special purpose” agencies such as the
IFC.
Standards, principles, guidelines
There are basically three standards (clarified on a sector specific level by guidelines)
that are often mentioned in the discussion.
• World Bank standards
• IFC standards
• Equator principles
The World Bank uses ten standards called “Safeguard Policies”, or “World Bank Stan-
dards”. World Bank Standards are fixed in the World Bank Pollution Prevention and
Abatement Handbook (PPAH) from 1998. For the use of the World Bank these were
complemented by older IFC guidelines from 1991-1993 on sectors not included in the
former.
The current IFC standards are called “performance standards” which have replaced the
previous “IFC Safeguard Policies”. As the IFC’s partners are commercial banks, a vol-
untary approach was adopted to reach similar standards of procedure in project
financing. The IFC safeguard policies on environmental assessment on which the
Equator principles are based, were issued 1998 by the IFC for its own projects. They
can be seen as a parallel effort to the World Bank’s policy to bind public development
spending.
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The IFC convened a meeting of banks in London in October 2002 to discuss environ-
mental and social issues in project finance. At that meeting, the banks present decided
to try to develop a banking industry framework for addressing environmental and social
risks in project financing based on the IFC “performance standards”. This led to the
drafting of the Equator Principles.
In 2003, the Equator principles – a reformulated version of the IFC performance stan-
dards - were released. They apply to projects financed by loans in developing countries
that cost more than $ 50 million.
The relationship between the IFC safeguard policies and the World Bank and IFC
guidelines can be described as follows: The safeguard policies generally represent an
approach to critical issues that cut across industry sectors, such as the protection of
natural habitats or the physical or economic displacement of people (resettlement),
where it is important to apply a consistent set of environmental and social principles.
The guidelines, on the other hand, are sector-specific environmental rules that are ap-
plicable to the processes, technology, and issues that apply in specific industries, and
represent good practice within that sector. As such, the policies and guidelines are mu-
tually supportive of one another.
The most important point for the Equator principles is that the banks apply the princi-
ples themselves. Only banks are able to say if the projects meet the IFC standards,
which is based on the IFC’s assessment (on the basis of its own performance stan-
dards). In some fields, e.g. effects of project financing on the biodiversity or cultural
heritage of the host country, external supervision is required by IFC.
In its preamble, the financial industry recognized that project financing offers substan-
tial opportunities to the creditor to promote responsible environmental stewardship and
socially responsible development. The principles thus provide a common framework for
procedures and standards in global finance.
The Equator Principles use a screening process for projects which is based on IFC's
environmental and social screening process. Projects will be categorised as A, B or C
(high, medium or low environmental or social risk) by the banks, using common termi-
nology. For A and B projects (high and medium risk), the borrower will complete an
Environmental Assessment addressing the environmental and social issues identified
in the categorisation process. After appropriate consultation with affected local stake-
holders, category A projects, and category B projects where appropriate will prepare
Environmental Management Plans which address mitigation and monitoring of envi-
ronmental and social risks.
Issues addressed are among many others
• assessment of the baseline environmental and social conditions;
• requirements under host country laws and regulations;
• Sustainable development and use of renewable natural resources;
• Protection of human health, cultural properties, and biodiversity, including en-
dangered species and sensitive ecosystems;
• Use of dangerous substances, major hazards, occupational health and safety.
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The international law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer evaluated the effects of the
principles in 2005 and came to a positive conclusion. They had had a positive effect on
the attitudes of lenders as well as on other aspects of responsible banking. Further-
more the Equator principles were becoming an industry standard for international
project finance. Even non-Equator banks had altered their business through competi-
tive pressure, said Freshfields. Freshfields is sure that the Equator banks now must
practise what they preach and address a number of pressing questions.
Criticism of the Equator principles
The criticism which is mainly voiced by NGO’s implies that the principles rely on self-
regulation by the finance industry. They claim that as the money-borrower has to sub-
mit an assessment for the creditworthiness of his project it is very likely that the effect
of the principles will in many cases be a conflict of (biased) experts – with foreseeable
results and no official referee. This was also the case in the OCP debate. The survey
WestLB put forward was criticised on many grounds. It was contradicted by an expert
survey by Robert Goodland, a former World Bank employee that said the OCP project
did at no time correspond with the World Bank standards.
Some NGO’s, the Green Party of North Rhine Westphalia, and academics discuss the
standards themselves and put forward that the World Bank standards - the so called
safeguard policies - go further than the Equator principles. The NGO’s fear that a proc-
ess of downgrading of standards is on the way.
The debate often narrows down to the question of whether the Equator principles are
less sharp than the IFC and World Bank standards.
One of the most important criticisms is that the Equator Principles cannot be enforced
by legal action. A judgement whether the companies comply with the standards is only
possible when companies themselves are accountable and accept a high level of
transparency and control. The question whether the banks have made real progress
remains open.
It is also unclear whether the banks implemented the principles properly. Do they really
make a difference when banks assess new ventures? Controversy occurred over the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in 2004 when banks said they stuck to the Equator princi-
ples and NGOs said they did not.
There is also a free-rider problem: some banks have explicitly put forward that they are
no Equator banks and have thus solicited business from less scrupulous clients. They
are taking advantage of the goodwill created by the others.
Another point is that the scope of the Equator principles is limited, they only address
project finance (and not financing by loans), whereas big infrastructural projects are
financed in other ways.
What is new?
Heffa Schücking of Urgewald is still not convinced of WestLB’s change of policy and
disappointed that Thomas Fischer did not explicitly condemn the OCP project. More-
over, Urgewald claims that WestLB learnt nothing: In January 2004, WestLB signed a
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contract for the financing of the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which threatens Bor-
jomi National Park in Georgia and crosses several acute conflict areas.
Banktrack, an NGO platform on bank policies located in the Netherlands says in its
“Anniversary Assessment” of the Equator Principles2 that WestLB provides insufficient
Equator reporting and offers no data on financed projects, describes neither goals nor
challenges to be met by the bank but points at the bank’s internal monitoring. It is still
unclear how the Equator Principles are implemented in new projects such as the loan
for a subsidiary of the Russian oil company Lukoil.
On the other hand, Oekom research, an independent German rating agency and re-
searcher specializing in sustainable investment, sustainability indeces and ratings,
states in 2005 that there was a clear trend of withdrawal from project financing of pro-
jects associated with social or cultural risk within German financial institutions.
2 Unproven Principles, The Equator Principles at Year Two, An Anniversary Assessment, 2004, pdf on
www.banktrack.org
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Resources
• Press release by WestLB: WestLB wins Financial Times "Sustainable
Bankers of the Year" Award
• stakeholder survey of WestLB
• members of the advisory Board of WestLB
• text on public banking in Europe and the European legislation
• press release by Urgewald
• original text or the equator principles from June 2003,
• list of relevant CoC
• link list for further reading
Further Information
• Bertelsmann Foundation, Handbook of CSR Case Studies – to be pub-
lished in fall 2006
• Equator principles, NGOs, fact sheet on Equator principles by the NGO’s
• Equator principles, Freshfields, executive summary of the evaluation survey of
the Equator principles by Freshfields, July 2005
• Green Party, “Fraktionsbeschluss” of the Green party in the parliament of North
Rhine Westphalia, January 2004
• WestLB, fact sheet
• Tennyson, Ros, The Partnering Initiative, 2004 “The partnering toolbook”, free
download with registrat ion:
http://thepartneringinitiative.org/mainpages/rb/login/index.php? Internatio-
nal und katastrophal, Das Projektfinanzierungsgeschäft der WestLB,
Südwind, U rgewald, 2004. free download http://net-news-global.de/pdf/west-
lb-studie2004.pdf
• Urgewald: Die Weltbank und der Privatsektor, Hilfe für die Reichen und lee-
re Versprechen für die Armen, Sept. 2005
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Link List
On West LB AG
• Fact sheet:
http://www.westlb.de/cms/sitecontent/westlb/ui/en/finanzinfo/factsheet.standard.
gid-N2FkNDZmMzU4OWFmYTIyMWM3N2Q2N2Q0YmU1NmI0OGU_.html
• Web site contains West LB sustainability report 2005
www.westlb.de/sustainability or use
http://www.westlb.de/cms/sitecontent/westlb/csr/en/Sustainability.standard.gid-
N2FkNDZmMzU4OWFmYTIyMWM3N2Q2N2Q0YmU1NmI0OGU_.html
• Chronicle:
http://www.westlb.de/cms/sitecontent/westlb/ui/en/wir_ueber_uns/chronologie.st
andard.gid-
N2FkNDZmMzU4OWFmYTIyMWM3N2Q2N2Q0YmU1NmI0OGU_.html
• results of the lawsuits against West LB managers
http://www.ftd.de/karriere_management/koepfe/80212.html
• stakeholder survey http://www.West LB.de/cms/sitecontent/West
LB/ui/en/Sustainability/dialog.-bin.acq/qual-
StdArticleMarginalPar-
Sys.0001.Cc20ParagraphBoxesParSys.0001.Cc13AttachmentList.0001.Attach
mentFile/Stakeholder_Survey.pdf
taken out of the West LB’s stakeholder survey 2005:
On the Equator principles and its critics
• Text of the principles, newest developments and list of banks which adopted the
principles, further information on standards http://www.equator-principles.com
• evaluation of the equator principles by Freshfields 2005
• Chan-Fishel, Michelle 2005: Unproven Principles – the Equator Principles at
Year Two, Utrecht, Bank Track,
www.banktrack.org/.../050606%20Unproven%20Principles,the%20Equator%20
Principles%20at%20year%20two.pdf
• A short evaluation of the Equator principles:
http://www.freshfields.com/practice/environment/publications/pdfs/12057.pdf
• Urgewald, website only available in German
http://www.urgewald.de/index.php?page=2
• This page gives a complete overview about the NGOs’ positions.
http://www.banktrack.org Joint NGO position paper on the revised Equator Prin-
ciples, April 26, 2006.
• Rainforest news and information http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/newwrr.htm
• http://www.banktrack.org/?show=23&visitor=1 NGO website with fact sheet on
the Equator Principles, critical comments and further information
• amazon watch website, www.amazonwatch.org Environmentalists Call on Ger-
man Bank to Cancel Loan for Ecuador Oil Pipeline Protest Held at WestLB’s
New York Headquarters. Passage cited in the text taken from:
http://www.amazonwatch.org/amazon/EC/ocp/index.php?page_number=5
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On the OCP project
Critics on the OCP project:
• http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/ocp/background_files/ocp_ecuad.html
• www.greenpeace.org
• Robert Goodland’s report 2002 http://www.regenwald.org/pdf/ocp-assess.pdf
Press clippings on the OCP project:
NGO’s complained that there was a “news blackout” on the topic because they
suspect an alliance of US finance industry with the big US newspapers such as the
New York Times and the Washington Post. (Worldwitch)
Times http://www.worldtwitch.com/ecuador_pipeline.htm In fact, there are not many
press clippings to be found.
• New York Times, 30 october 2002,
• Financial Times, 23 august 2002
• compilation of German newspaper articles here:
http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/ocp/German-news.htm
Report of the two representatives of the North Rhine Westphalian Parliament on
the OCP project in German: http://www.regenwald-institut.de/deutsch/index.html
On CoC
• pdf report on CoC for German federal government: adelphi report 02/05
www.adelphi-research.org sent by email
On the IFC
• Brief information on IFC www.ifc.org http://www.ifc.org/about, Its president is
Paul Wolfowitz.
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/about.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/IFC_in_Brief_2006/$FIL
E/IFC_in_Brief_2006.pdf free download „IFC in brief“, seven pages of text.
I FC’s safeguard policies http://www.ifc.org/enviro
http://www.oekom-research.de/index_english.html
Short information on the German banking system
• IFW Kiel 2004, Koetter, Nestmann, Stolz, Wedow: structures and trends in Ger-
man banking, http://www.ifw-kiel.de/pub/kap/2004/kap1225.pdf
• University of Frankfurt http://www.wiwi.uni-
frankfurt.de/schwerpunkte/finance/wp/1243.pdf The transformation of the Ger-
man financial system, Hackethal, Schmidt, Tyrell 2005.
• Regulation: http://www.bafin.de/cgi-
bin/bafin.pl?verz=&sprache=1&filter=&ntick=0
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Press Releases
Press Release by WestLB on June 13 2006
WestLB wins Financial Times "Sustainable Bankers of the Year" Award
WestLB AG has been awarded first place in the “Sustainable Bankers of the Year” category at
the annual sustainable banking awards organised by the FT and the IFC (International Fi-
nance Corporation). The judges particularly praised the short timeframe during which
WestLB had succeeded in embedding sustainability principles across its whole company and inte-
grating them in the business process. In addition, WestLB was shortlisted in the “FT 2006
Sustainable Bank of the Year” and “Sustainable Energy Deal of the Year” categories.
“We are delighted to be honoured this way,” said Dr. Thomas R. Fischer, Chairman of WestLB’s
Managing Board. “It both recognises what we have achieved already and encourages us to go
further down the same road.” As co-initiator of the Equator Principles” and a signatory of the
United nations’ “Global Compact”, the Bank is committed to upholding comprehensive environ-
mental and social standards. This underscores its role as a globally responsible business.
The Sustainability Management Group, established in 2004 as part of the CEO’s office is re-
sponsible for implementing the Bank’s Sustainability Principles and for achieving closer
dialogue with stakeholder groups. As part of its commitment to transparency and responsibil-
ity, WestLB has published its current Sustainability Report in conformation with the guidelines
of the “Global reporting Initiative”.
http://www.westlb.de/cms/sitecontent/westlb/ui/en/Sustainability/Archive/ftsba.standard.gidN2FkN
DZmMzU4OWFmYTIyMWM3N2Q2N2Q0YmU 1 NmI0OGU .html
Leading Banks Announce Adoption of Equator Principles
Original press release on june 4, 2003 taken from the Equator principles’ Website
http://www.equator-principles.com/pr030604.shtml
Ten leading banks from seven countries today announced the adoption of the "Equator
Principles," a set of guidelines developed by the banks for managing social and envi-
ronmental issues related to the financing of development projects. The banks will apply
the principles globally and to project financings in all industry sectors, including mining,
oil and gas, and forestry.
The banks adopting the Equator Principles today are ABN AMRO Bank, N.V., Barclays
plc, Citigroup, Inc., Crédit Lyonnais, Credit Suisse First Boston, HVB Group, Rabobank
Group, The Royal Bank of Scotland, West LB AG, and Westpac Banking Corporation.
Together, these banks underwrote approximately $14.5 billion of project loans in 2002,
representing approximately 30% of the project loan syndication market globally in
2002, according to Dealogic.
The Equator Principles are based on the policies and guidelines of the World Bank and
International Finance Corporation (IFC). The banks received extensive advice and
guidance from IFC, the private-sector investment arm of the World Bank, in drafting the
Equator Principles.
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In implementing the Equator Principles, banks currently have or will put in place inter-
nal policies and processes consistent with the principles.
In adopting the Equator Principles, a bank undertakes to provide loans only to those
projects whose sponsors can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the bank their ability
and willingness to comply with comprehensive processes aimed at ensuring that pro-
jects are developed in a socially responsible manner and according to sound
environmental management practices.
The banks will apply the Equator Principles to all loans for projects with a capital cost of
$50 million or more. Project finance, an important financing method in private-sector
development globally, refers to the financing of projects where the repayment of the
loan is dependent upon the revenues that a project is expected to generate once it is
up and running.
The Equator Principles will use a screening process for projects which is based on
IFC's environmental and social screening process. Projects will be categorized as A, B
or C (high, medium or low environmental or social risk) by the banks, using common
terminology. For A and B projects (high and medium risk), the borrower will complete
an Environmental Assessment addressing the environmental and social issues identi-
fied in the categorization process. After appropriate consultation with affected local
stakeholders, category A projects, and category B projects where appropriate, will pre-
pare Environmental Management Plans which address mitigation and monitoring of
environmental and social risks.
The Environmental Assessment will address such issues as:
• Sustainable development and use of renewable natural resources.
• Protection of human health, cultural properties, and biodiversity, including en-
dangered species and sensitive ecosystems.
• Use of dangerous substances.
• Major hazards.
• Occupational health and safety.
• Fire prevention and life safety.
• Socioeconomic impacts.
• Land acquisition and land use.
• Involuntary resettlement.
• Impacts on indigenous peoples and communities.
• Cumulative impacts of existing projects, the proposed project, and anticipated
future projects.
• Participation of affected parties in the design, review and implementation of the
project.
• Consideration of environmentally and socially preferable alternatives.
• Efficient production, delivery and use of energy.
• Pollution prevention and waste minimization, pollution controls (liquid effluents
and air emissions) and solid and chemical waste management.
The borrower will be required to demonstrate to the bank that the project complies with
host country laws and the World Bank and IFC Pollution Prevention and Abatement
Guidelines for the relevant industry sector. For projects in the emerging markets, the
borrower would also have to demonstrate that the Environmental Assessment has
taken into account the IFC Safeguard Polices, which provide guidance on issues such
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as natural habitats, indigenous peoples, involuntary resettlement, safety of dams, for-
estry, and cultural property.
The full text of the Equator Principles and FAQ about the Equator Principles can be
found at www.equator-principles.com
The World Bank and IFC Pollution Prevention and Abatement Guidelines are available
at:
World Bank - Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook
IFC - Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines
IFC Safeguard Policies can be found at:
IFC - Safeguard Policies
Standard & Poors Long-Term Debt and Moody's Ratings Equivalents
http://magazine.globeinvestor.com/servlet/ArticleNews/commentarystory/GIGOLD/2002
1028/dalemag/magazine/home
Investment Grade/agency Moody's Standard & Poors
Exceptional Aaa, Aaa1, Aaa2, Aaa3 AAA, AAA-, AA+
Excellent Aa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 AA, AA-, A+
Good A, A1, A2, A3 A, A-, BBB+
Adequate Baa, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3 BBB, BBB-, BB+
Speculative Grade
Questionable Ba, Ba1, Ba2, Ba3 BB, BB-, B+
Poor B, B1, B2, B3 B, B-, CCC+
Very Poor Caa, Caa1, Caa2, Caa3 CCC, CCC-, CC+
Extremely Poor Ca, Ca1, Ca2, Ca3 CC,CC-, C+
Lowest C C
Press release urgewald on 22 february 2006
Taken from urgewald’s website, www.urgewald.de
Der Verwaltungsrat der Weltbank hat gestern die neuen Umwelt- und Sozialstandards
seiner Privatsektor-Tochter ‚International Finance Corporation’ (IFC) verabschiedet.
Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen (NRO) und unabhängige Experten kritisierten die ge-
planten Änderungen massiv.
„Besonders enttäuscht sind wir von Entwicklungsministerin Wieczorek-Zeul,“ stellt
Knud Vöcking von der Umwelt- und Menschenrechtsorganisation urgewald fest. „Im-
mer wieder hat das BMZ öffentlich erklärt, dass es mit ihm keine Abschwächung der
Standards geben wird. Jetzt stimmt das Ministerium zu, dass unabhängige Umwelt-
und Sozialverträglichkeitsprüfungen (USVP) de facto abgeschafft werden.“
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Denn nach den neuen Richtlinien reicht es der IFC, wenn Firmen, die einen Kredit be-
antragen, Umwelt- und Sozialverträglichkeit in Eigenregie prüfen. „Damit kann sich
jeder Bergbaukonzern selbst attestieren, dass Goldabbau mit Zyanideinsatz notwendig
ist, oder dass Naturreservate unter den Bagger geraten müssen. Wenn ein Unterneh-
men sich selbst bescheinigt, es sei wirtschaftlich nicht anders machbar, können
Menschen von ihrem Land vertrieben werden, Indigene ihrer kulturellen Wurzeln be-
raubt werden. Und alles im Namen der Entwicklung,“ empört sich Vöcking.
Selbst die US-Regierung, nicht besonders sozial oder ökologisch sensibel, lehnt diese
neuen Regeln der IFC ab und hat sich deshalb der Stimme enthalten. (…)
Für Vöcking stellt sich nun die Frage nach der grundsätzlichen Legitimität der IFC:
„Diese Institution hat zwei Gesichter. Zum einen wird mit großer Rhetorik Armutsbe-
kämpfung gepredigt. In der Praxis aber hat sich IFC zur Hauptaufgabe gemacht,
großen Öl- und Bergbaukonzernen billiges Geld für die Ausbeutung der Rohstoffe La-
teinamerikas, Afrikas, Asiens und Ozeaniens bereitzustellen. Umwelt- und
Sozialstandards stellen dabei offensichtlich nur ‚bürokratische Hürden‘ dar. Für solch
ein Geschäftsmodell dürfen aber unsere Steuergelder nicht herhalten.“
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Supervisory board of West LB
Supervisory Board of West LB, taken from the West LB Website on 9th may, 2006.
Chairman, Dr. Rolf Gerlach
Praesident, Westfaelischer Sparkassen- und
Giroverband
48159 Muenster
Deputy Chairman,
Gerd-Uwe Loeschmann
Direktor, West LB AG
40217 Duesseldorf
Dr. Karlheinz Bentele
Praesident, Rheinischer Sparkassen- und Gi-
roverband
40217 Duesseldorf
Thorsten Ellwanger
Prokurist, West LB AG
20095 Hamburg
Bernd Fiegler
Stellvertretender Landesbezirksleiter
ver.di
Landesbezirk NRW
40210 Duesseldorf
Rolf Finger
Gewerkschaftssekretaer im
Fachbereich Finanzdienstleistungen
ver.di
Landesbezirk NRW
40210 Duesseldorf
Horst-Wolfgang Klophaus
Bevollmaechtigter West LB AG
40217 Duesseldorf
Joachim Kraemer
Generalbevollmaechtigter West LB AG
40217 Duesseldorf
Dr. Helmut Linssen
Minister Finanzministerium des Landes Nord-
rhein-Westfalen
40479 Duesseldorf
Dr. Siegfried Luther
Ehem. stellv. Vorstandsvorsitzender der Ber-
telsmann AG
33311 Guetersloh
Manfred Matthewes
Prokurist, West LB AG
40217 Duesseldorf
Udo Molsberger
Landesdirektor,
Landschaftsverband Rheinland
50679 Koeln
Dr. Hans-Ulrich Predeick
Erster Landesrat, Landschaftsverband Westfa-
len-Lippe
48147 Muenster
Dr. Dietrich Ruemker
Vorsitzender des Vorstandes Landesbank
Schleswig-Holstein, a.D.
c/o HSH Nordbank AG
24103 Kiel
Heinz-Guenter Sander
Bankangestellter, West LB AG
40217 Duesseldorf
Gustav Adolf Schroeder
Vorsitzender des Vorstandes, Sparkasse
KoelnBonn
50667 Koeln
Christiane Stascheit
Stellvertretende Geschaeftsfuehrerin fuer den
Bezirk Duesseldorf
ver.di
40213 Duesseldorf
Hans-Georg Vogt
Vorsitzender des Vorstandes, Sparkasse Bie-
lefeld
33605 Bielefeld
Elisabeth Weber
Prokuristin, West LB AG
40217 Duesseldorf
Heinz Welter
Vorsitzender des Vorstandes, Sparkasse
Neuss
41460 Neuss
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List of relevant CoC for companies
Taken out of the adelphi report 02/05, www.adelphi-research.org
• Amnesty International Human Rights Principles for Companies (1998)
• Business Principles for Combatting Bribery, Transparency International and So-
cial Accountability International, 2002
• Equator Principles, 2003
• European Parliament resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises op-
erating in developing countries, towards a European Code of Conduct (1999)
• Extractive industries Transparency Initiative (2004)
• Global Sullivan Principles (1977)
• International Chamber of Commerce. Rules of conduct to combat extortion and
bribery (1999)
• International Council on Mining and Metals Principles (in development)
• OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises (1976, 2000)
• Global compact (this is not a real CoC but a network of companies to encour-
age policy dialogue but it operates on the basis of ten principles that are
becoming a codex)
• UN norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other busi-
ness enterprises with regard to human rights (2003)
• US-UK principles on security and human rights (2000)
• Wolfsberg anti money laundering principles (2002)
Results of the stakeholder survey carried out by WestLB
Taken from the sustainability pages of West LB’s website (complete link see above)
